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1.   Introduction 
 
Education or human capital is a prominent positive influence on economic 
growth and development. In particular, educating girls increases human capital and 
growth (Schultz, 1994; Knowles et al., 2002; Klasen, 2002; Dollar and Gatti, 1999). 
Educating girls is doubly advantageous. As with males, increased human capital of 
females directly increases incomes and growth. However, there is a further benefit of 
educating girls because  of the positive influence of mothers on the education and 
health of their children (Schultz, 2002; Doepke and Tertilt, 2009). Education of girls 
is  therefore  important  for  economic  development  because  of  the  human capital 
transmission through mothers.
1 
Political  elites  in  autocratically  ruled  societies  have  incentives  not  to 
encourage education and investment in human capital because economic development 
will  give  rise  to  a  middle  class  that  will  seek  democratic  institutions  and 
accountability from government (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Welzman, 2010).
2 
If  education  of  girls  is  in  particular  conducive  to  economic  development,  self 
preservation of political elites in non democratic societies is a suggested explanation 
for gender bias against girls in education in government schools.
3 An investigation of 
                                                 
1 One of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to eliminate gender inequality 
in education at the primary and secondary levels (UN 2008). However, the goal does not appear to be 
on track for attainment. 
2 See Hillman (2007) for an overview of the incentives of non democratic governments not to provide 
quality free access education. 
3 Government does not in general have a monopoly on schooling. Private provision of education is 
however usually small relative to public provision. In low income countries, private schools are for the 
elites,  whose  children  are  also  often  sent  abroad  for  education.  In  reaction  to  the  inadequacies  of 
government provided schooling for the general population in low income countries, there have also 
been  self financed  user price  schools  for  children  of  poor  families.  Hillman  and  Jenkner  (2004) 
describe how parents in low income countries have circumvented low quality or absent government 
education through user pay schooling.   
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the reasons for gender inequality in education should therefore consider the role of 
political institutions.
4  
An alternative hypothesis is that culture and religion determine attitudes to 
education of girls. For example, a report on democratization in Afghanistan (Larson, 
2009) states that: 
“Afghanistan is not democratic due to the lack of these key factors: Is this a 
democracy, when girls can’t go to school to read, when violence against girls 
takes  place  in  many  provinces  like  Kandahar  and  Faryab?  When  acid  is 
spread on the faces of girls, where is democracy? When girls are poisoned in 
the schools of Parwan how we can say that we have democracy? 
The respondent was here referring to a series of incidents across the country in which 
acid  has  been  thrown  at  schoolgirls  by  extremists  ideologically  opposed  to  girls’ 
education. In Parwan province in May 2009 there were reports of toxic gas being 
dispersed in girls’ school playgrounds by fundamentalist groups also.” (Larson 2009: 
13). 
Empirical  evidence  from  prior  studies  on  the  influence  of  democracy  on 
gender equality in education is mixed. A study by Brown (2004) employs the data of 
Barro  and  Lee  (1993)  on  educational  attainment,  with  the  dependent  variable  the 
average number of years women attended school divided by the average number of 
years men attended school in 1990. Democracy is measured by the sub indicators of 
POLITY III. The independent variables are mean values for each country between 
                                                 
4 With regard to possible reverse causation, previous studies have found that education has a positive 
influence on democracy (for example, Castelló Climent 2008, Barro 1999, Glaeser et al. 2004, 
Papaioannou and Siourounis 2005). Acemoglu et al. (2005) suggest however, that after inclusion of 
fixed effects, there is no evidence that education enhances democracy. On the related causal relation 
between income and democracy, see Gundlach and Paldam (2009).  Income distribution, which is itself 
politically determined, can influence public spending on education, in particular on different levels of 
education: Di Gioacchino and Sabani (2009) show that public education spending can give rise to 
persistent inequality if more unequal societies continue to spend more on higher levels of education 
rather than basic levels of education.   
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1960 and 1990. The sample consisted of 105 high and low income countries. The 
results  suggested  that  only  an  executive recruitment  sub component  of  democracy 
had a positive influence on gender equality in education.
5 Beer (2009) considered the 
relation  between  gender  equality  and  political  regimes  and  found  the  unexpected 
result that democracy may have negatively influenced gender equality in educational 
attainment. Her dependent variable for gender equality in education is the difference 
between the average years of educational attainment of women and men. Democracy 
is measured by the level and stock of the POLITY IV democracy indices, as well as 
the  year  in  which  women  gained  the  right  to  vote.  The  sample  consisted  of  179 
developed  and  low income  countries between  1960  and  2004.  She  concluded  that 
countries with longer term democracy and longer duration of women’s suffrage had 
higher proportions of female to male life expectancy, lower fertility rates, and higher 
labour force participation rates, due to the ability of women to advance their interests 
through voting. However, both the stock of democracy and the year in which women 
gained  suffrage  had  a  negative  influence  on  gender  equality  in  education,  so 
contradicting  a  hypothesized  positive  relationship  between  democracy  and  gender 
equality  in  education.  The  results  are  sensitive  to  the  inclusion  of  an  illiteracy 
variable, exclusion of which made the democracy variable positive (Beer, 2009, p. 
224). 
Norton  and  Tomal  (2009)  used  the  data  of  Barro  and  Lee  (1993)  on 
educational  attainment  to  show  that  religion  has  influenced  gender  equality  in 
education.  The  dependent  variable  was  the  log odds  ratio  of  female  educational 
attainment and the log odds ratio of the gender gap (absolute differences between 
                                                 
5 Time from initiation of suffrage has been used to study educational opportunities for women (Beer 
2009). We do not use this variable because of ambiguities in the relation between the right to vote and 
democracy.  In  numerous  low income  countries,  people  have  the  right  to  vote,  or  indeed  may  be 
compelled to vote, but there is only one candidate for the position of president or other office. 
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male and female percentages for four levels of educational attainment). Religion was 
measured  by  the  share  of  the  population  that  is  Buddhist,  ethno religion,  Hindu, 
Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant or Roman Catholic (data by Barrett et al. 2001). The 
sample consisted of 97 high and low income countries. The results suggest that the 
proportion of Hindu and Muslim adherents in a country has had a negative influence 
on female educational attainment.  
The  empirical  strategies  of  the  above  studies  on  democracy  and  gender 
equality  have  shortcomings  that  we  have  aimed  to  correct.  We  depart  from  the 
previous studies in three ways. First, we use the new Democracy Dictatorship (DD) 
variables from Cheibub et al. (2010) and the Polity IV sub indicator “Constraints on 
chief  executive”.  Second,  we  use  enrolment  ratios  disaggregated  at  the primary 
and secondary, and tertiary levels to measure gender inequality. Third, we focus on 
the recent past from 1991 to 2006 to investigate the relation between gender equality 
in  education  and  a  country’s  political  institutions.  We  also  juxtapose  political 
institutions  against  cultural  and  religious  influences.  We  measure  the  influence  of 
culture  and  religion  with  dummy  variables  that  take  on  the  value  one  when  a 
particular religion is dominant in a country. The data is from the Encyclopedia of 
World Geography (1994) and the CIA World Factbook (2010). For robustness checks, 
we also employ the data on religion by Alesina et al. (2003). 
We find that political institutions do not matter for advancement of gender 
equality in education whereas culture and religion do. In section 2 we elaborate on the 
background for our empirical estimates. Section 3 presents the data and empirical 




2.  Background 
Democracy promotes gender equality. Women can better express their views 
and  interests  in  democracies;  democracies  promote  gender  equality  through  an 
educated  middle  class;  democratic  governments  spend  on  educating  girls;  income 
redistribution and public good provision in democracies reduce pressure on sons to 
take care of their parents in old age and illness (when parents expect their sons to take 
care of them in old age, incentives of a family to invest in the education of a son 
rather than in the education of a daughter increase); and men in democracies have a 
self interest in educating their daughters. Democracy also facilitates gender equality 
through  mobilization  of  women  and  electoral  accountability  (Beer,  2009,  p.218): 
women can better organize to express their views and interests; they can obtain and 
disseminate  information;  and  they  may  lobby  for  improving  their  status  through 
education. Women may also be empowered to positions of leadership. Democracy 
also increases women’s bargaining power within the household (Klasen and Wink, 
2003),  which  can  permit  a  mother  to  invest  more  in  health  and  education  of  her 
children. The improved bargaining position of a mother can improve the bargaining 
position  of  a  daughter  in  relation  to  a  son in law  (Doepke  and  Tertilt,  2009). 
Democratic  institutions  are  therefore  conducive  to  gender  equality,  including  in 
particular in  education. In contrast,  as noted, in countries with limited  democracy 
rulers who seek to sustain political entrenchment are not interested in the development 
of  an  educated  middle  class  and  may  discriminate  against  girls  because  of  the 
important development role of educated mothers.
6  
                                                 
6  Colonial  regimes,  on  the  other  hand,  often  kept  women  disadvantaged.  Women  have 
disproportionally  been  employed  in  low skilled  agriculture,  for  example,  in  cash  crops  plantations 
(Adams, 2006). Brown (2000) describes the effects of colonization and democracy on enrolment for 
Middle  Eastern,  African,  Asian,  Central  and  South  American  countries.  His  results  suggest  that 
colonization decreased enrolment ratios in Sub Saharan Africa, despite a strong relationship between 
regime types and enrolment ratios in education.  
  7
Social norms affect gender equality. For example, with regard to labour force 
participation, sons who are raised by a working mother tend to be more supportive of 
a working wife (Fernandez et al. 2004). In a similar vein, increased exposure to a 
female  leader  in  every day life  reduces  the  bias  that  males  may  have  against 
supporting a female political leader.
7 Norms can therefore promote equal educational 
opportunities for girls.
8 
However,  religion  and  other  aspects  of  culture  including  ethics  and  the 
absence of the rule of law can inhibit education of  girls (Dollar and  Gatti, 1999; 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Hillman and Jenkner, 2004). Hillman (2004) has described 
Nietzschean behaviour as the strong being unconstrained by ethics in actions toward 
the weak. With women naturally physically weaker than men, women in Nietzschean 
societies  are  victims  of  male  domination,  which  includes  adverse  discrimination 
against girls in schooling. If the role of the girl or woman is no more than to bear 
children and to provide satisfaction and services to males, education of girls may not 
enhance  the  perceived  benefits  to  men,  who  are  the  “strong”  and  dominate  the 
women, who are the “weak”. Women can then also become objects to be purchased 
for use and traded (Di Tommaso et al., 2009). The uses to which women are subjected 
may therefore not require education. Indeed, education of girls can be an impediment 
to  achieving  the  objectives  through  submission  of  women  sought  by  men  in 
Nietzschean societies. In cases of radical Islam, education of girls may be punishable 
by death, for the girls and for their teachers. 
 
                                                 
7 Beaman et al. (2009) show that Indian villagers who have never experienced a female leader prefer 
male leaders. Exposure to a female leader weakens stereotypes about gender roles in the public and 
domestic spheres and eliminates negative bias in how female leaders' effectiveness is perceived among 
male villagers. 
8 Indeed, the evidence is that girls take better advantage of educational entitlements than boys. For a 
summary, see Hillman (2009, chapter 8).  
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3.    Data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data 
We use data on enrolment ratios of boys and girls in education at the primary 
and  secondary,  and  tertiary  level,  from  the  World  Bank  Development  Indicators. 
Enrolments at the primary and secondary level are measured by one variable. The 
dataset contains up to 157 countries. We employ a cross section for the year 2006. For 
some countries, most recent data are not available for 2006 but for 2005 or 2007. We 
then use the data for 2005 or 2007 to include as many countries as possible. 
The ratio of girls and boys in primary and secondary, and tertiary education 
differs across regions. An enrolment ratio of 1 indicates parity between females and 
males and deviations below (above) 1 can be interpreted as a degree of male (female) 
advantage on the enrolment measure. Girls are most underrepresented in South Asia 
and  Africa.  In  Chad,  for  example,  the  enrolment  ratio  in  primary  and  secondary 
education  was  0.61  and  in  tertiary  education  0.06.  Gender  equality  has  been 
pronounced in Australia Oceania, South America and Central Asia. In Uruguay and 
Mongolia, for example, the girls and boys enrolment ratio in primary and secondary 
education was 1.06 (both countries) and in tertiary education 1.68 and 1.56 on average 
respectively. In high income countries and also former communist countries (Eastern 
Europe), gender equality in education was more common which transpires in girls 
and boys enrolment ratios in primary and secondary education around 1 with low 
variance. 
Regional  differences  in  education  are  pronounced  at  the  tertiary  level: 
discrimination against girls is high in Africa (enrolment ratio 0.60 on average). Girls 
are overrepresented in the Middle East (enrolment ratio 1.54 on average) and South 
America (girl and boys enrolment ratio 1.36 on average).   
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The means of measurement of democracy have been the POLITY IV and the 
Freedom  House  indices.  These  indices  have,  however,  been  criticized  on  several 
grounds  (Munk  and  Verkuilen  2002,  Vreeland  2008,  Cheibub  et  al.  2010).  For 
example, Munck and Verkuilen (2002:28) conclude that Freedom House is an index 
“which [exemplifies] problems in all areas of conceptualization, measurement, and 
aggregation.” The POLITY IV index has been criticized for similar reasons, but “the 
usefulness of the POLITY IV dataset lies in its components” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 
76).  The  POLITY  index  has  five  components:  XCONST  (Constraints  on  chief 
executive),  XRCOMP  (Competiveness  of  executive  recruitment),  XROPEN 
(Openness  of  executive  recruitment),  PARCOMP  (Competiveness  of  political 
participation), and PAREG (Regulation of political participation). In particular, the 
Chief  Executive  variable  “provides  useful  information  about  whether  the  chief 
executive  has  unlimited  authority,  whether  there  is  a  legislature  with  slight  or 
moderate  ability  to  check  the power  of  the  executive,  whether  the  legislature  has 
substantial ability to check the executive, or whether the executive has parity with or 
is subordinate to the legislature” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 76). We therefore employ the 
Constraints on Chief Executive variable as a democracy measure. 
Cheibub et al. (2010) introduce a Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) measure 
of  political  regimes.  The  DD  measure  basically  distinguishes  between  regimes  in 
which  executive  and  legislative  offices  are  filled  through  contested  elections  and 
those in which they are not. The DD measure takes on the value 1 for democracies 
and 0 otherwise. Cheibub et al. (2010) provide a more encompassing discussion on 
classifying democracies and dictatorships. 
To address reasonable concerns about reverse causality between democracy 
and gender equality in education, we relate gender equality in education in 2006 to the  
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average of democracy over the 1991 2005 period. We focus on the period after 1991 
because  the  DD  measure  is  available  for  several  countries  only  after  1991.  The 
variable Constraints on chief executive is not available for all years for every country. 
When  missing  data  points  for  individual  years  occur,  we  take  averages  of  the 
available years for the individual country. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the association between the averaged XCONST and 
the DD democracy indices and the girls and boys enrolment ratios at the primary and 
secondary  level  respectively.  Democracy  and  gender  equality  in  education  at  the 
primary  and  secondary  level  are  positively  associated.  In  countries  such  as 
Afghanistan,  Chad  and  Yemen, the  girls and boys  enrolment  ratios as  well as the 
democracy variables display low values. In Mongolia and the Dominican Republic, 
by contrast, gender equality at the primary and secondary level and democracy are 
advanced. We do not show the respective figures for the girls and boys enrolment 
ratios at the tertiary level and the XCONST and DD democracy indices. The positive 
relationship between gender equality at the tertiary level and democracy is somewhat 
less pronounced than the positive relationship between gender equality at the primary 
and secondary level and democracy. 
We measure religion with dummy variables that take on the value one when a 
particular religion is dominant in a country using information from the Encyclopedia 
of  World  Geography  (1994)  and  the  CIA  World  Factbook  (2010).  The  religion 
variables  are  time invariant.  Both  databases  report  for  each  country  the  same 
dominant religions.
9 Measuring religion is much less controversial than measuring 
                                                 
9 The three main sources of the Encyclopedia of World Geography (1994) are: Britannica World Data 
(Encyclpedia Britannica Inc, Chicago annual); Stateman's Yearbook (McMillan London, 1993), 
Keesings Record of World Events (Keesings Redhill updated throughout the year), The data relate to 




democracy. Muslim dominated countries are, for example, Afghanisthan, Iran, Iraq, 
Saudia Arabia. By contrast, OECD countries are dominated by Christianity. 
Figure 3 illustrates the association between Christianity and the girls and boys 
enrolment ratios at the primary and secondary level. Christianity and gender equality 
in education at the primary and secondary level are positively associated. By contrast, 
Figure  4  shows  that  Islam  and  gender  equality  in  education  at  the  primary  and 
secondary level are negatively associated. We do not show the respective figures for 
the girls and boys enrolment ratios at the tertiary level and the religion variables. The 
relationship  between  gender  equality  at  the  tertiary  level  and  religion  is  less 
pronounced  than  the  relationship  between  gender  equality  at  the  primary  and 
secondary level and religion. 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
The base line cross sectional model has the following form: 
 
EFMi = α + β Democracyij  +Σk δ Religionik + Σl ε Regionil +Σm ζ xim + η Colonyi + ui                     
 
with i = 1,...,157; j=1,2; k=1,...,5; l=1,...,7; m=1,...,4, where EFMi  is the girls and boys 
enrolment ratio at the  primary and secondary, and tertiary level for country i. Political 
institutions  are  indicated  by  the  variable  Democracyij  which  describes  the  two 
alternative democracy measures: the Chief in Executive variable and the Democracy 
Dictatorship indicator respectively. We include one of the two democracy measures. 
Σk  δ  Religionik  describes  the  set  religion  dummy  variables.  The  religion  dummy 
variables take on the value of one when a particular religion is dominant and zero 
otherwise (see, for example, Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). We  
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distinguish five religions: Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism and Indigenous 
Religion. Our reference category is Christianity.
10 Protestantism led, for example, to 
better education (Becker and Woessmann 2009, 2010). The proportion of Hindu and 
Muslim adherents in a country has been shown to have a negative influence on female 
educational  attainment  (Norton  and  Tomal  2009).  We  therefore  expect  negative 
influences of the religion dummies on gender equality in education compared to the 
reference  category  Christianity.  Σl  ε  Regionil  describes  a  set  of  regional  dummy 
variables, which take on the value of one when a country is in a particular region and 
zero  otherwise.  We  distinguish  between  eight  different  regions:  Africa,  Asia,  the 
Middle East, South America and the West Indies, North America, Eastern Europe and 
Central  Asia,  Western  Europe  and  Australia Oceania.  To  avoid  multicollinearity 
between the region dummies, one of the region dummies functions as the reference 
category (here Africa). The estimated effects of the other region dummies are then 
interpreted  as  deviations  from  the  reference  category.  Colonyi  describes  a  dummy 
variable that takes on the value one when the respective country was a British or 
French  colony  and  zero  otherwise.  We  expect  a  negative  influence  of  the  colony 
variable on the girls and boys enrolment ratios in education.
11 The vector xi contains 
our political economic control variables. Following the related studies on democracy 
and education, we include the logarithm of GDP per capita (Dollar and Gatti 1999, 
Klasen 2002). Gender equality in education is expected to increase with GDP per 
capita. We also include trade openness (as a share of GDP). The predicted influence 
of  trade openness  on  gender  equality  on  education  is  ambiguous.  Higher  trade 
openness  could  decrease  gender  equality  because  in  several  developing  countries 
                                                 
10 The British introduced Christianity to the African and Asian colonies. Most of the African countries 
are primarily Anglican or protestant and some countries follow their own variants of Christianity such 
as Independent Black Christian etc.  
11 Brown (2000) illustrates the effect of colonialism on enrolment and Cooray (2009) the influence of 
colonialism on the adult literacy rate.  
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unskilled  females  have  been  employed  in  labour  intensive  export  industries  (e.g., 
Cagatay and Ozler 1995, Fontana and Wood 2000, Balliamoune Lutz and McGillvray 
2007). By contrast, higher trade openness could also increase gender equality because 
trade openness is expected to narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers  and  men  and  women.  Higher  relative  wages  may  give  women  access  to 
educational opportunities. We also include  government expenditures  as a share of 
GDP  as  a  proxy  for  public  spending  on  education.  Encompassing  data  on  public 
spending  on  education  are  not  available.  We  expect  a  positive  influence  of 
government  expenditures  on  gender  equality  in  education.  We  also  include  the 
logarithm  of  total  population  to  control  for  country  size.  Female  employment  in 
agriculture (as a share of total employment) is not available, however, for the entire 
sample. Including female employment in agriculture significantly reduces the sample, 
though it does not change the inferences. We therefore discuss the influence of female 
employment in agriculture in the robustness tests section. Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics of all variables included. 
We  estimate  the  model  with  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  with  robust 
standard errors that are clustered by region. 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Basic results 
Table  2  illustrates  the  regression  results  for  education  at  the  primary  and 
secondary  level.  The  control  variables  mostly  display  the  expected  signs  and  are 
statistically significant in most cases. The regional dummy variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% or 5% level in columns (1) and (3) and have positive signs. The 
Middle East regional dummy variable is also statistically significant at the 5% level in  
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columns (2) and (4). The regional dummy variables indicate that the girls and boys 
enrolment  ratios  have  been  higher  in  Middle  East  compared  to  Africa  (reference 
category). The log GDP per capita has the expected positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (4). It shows that the girls and boys 
enrolment  ratios  increased  by  about  4  percentage  points  when  GDP  per  capita 
increased  by  1%.  Trade  openness  is  not  statistically  significant.  The  government 
expenditure variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (2) with an 
unexpected  negative  sign  but  is  not  statistically  significant  in  column  (4).  The 
numerical meaning of the coefficient is that girls and boys enrolment ratios decreased 
by about 0.15 percentage points when government expenditures (as a share of GDP) 
increased  by  one  percentage  point.  The  log  population  variable  and  the  colony 
variable are not statistically significant. 
The results in Table 2 show that democracy did not influence gender equality 
in education: the coefficient of the Chief in Executive variable has a positive sign in 
columns  (1)  and  (2),  but  is  not  statistically  significant.  The  coefficient  of  the 
Democracy Dictatorship variable has a negative sign but is not statistically significant 
in  columns  (3)  and  (4).  By  contrast,  the  indigenous  religion  dummy  variable  is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4) with a negative sign; the 
Islam religion dummy variable also has a negative sign and is statistically significant 
at the 5% level in columns (1) and (3), at the 10% level in column (4), while it is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels in column (2). The indigenous religion 
and Islam religion dummy variables indicate that girls and boys enrolment ratios have 
been lower by about 18 and 6 percentage points in countries with Indigenous and 
Muslim religion compared to countries with Christian religion (reference category).  
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Table  3  illustrates  the  regression  results  for  education  at  the  tertiary  level. 
Most  of  the  control  variables  again  display  the  expected  signs.  The  log  GDP per 
capita  variable  is  not  statistically  significant,  however.  Gender  equality  in  tertiary 
education  was  significantly  lower  by  about  60,  28  and  34  percentage  points  in 
countries  with  Buddhist,  Muslim  and  Indigenous  religion  than  in  countries  with 
predominant  Christian  religion.  The  democracy  variables  are  not  statistically 
significant, suggesting that political institutions do not influence gender equality in 
education. 
 
4.2 Robustness Tests 
We checked the robustness of the results in several ways. Gender equality has 
been very pronounced in (1) socialist countries and (2) high income countries. We 
therefore  excluded  all  Eastern  European  countries  and  high  income  countries 
(threshold  3855  USD  per  capita  following  World  Bank  definitions),  because  the 
socialist  and  established  democratic  past  might  bias  our  estimates.  The  results 
reported in Table 4 indicate that excluding the former socialist European and high 
income countries changes our base line inferences in favour of a positive influence of 
democracy  on  gender  equality  in  education.  The  Chief  in  Executive  variable  is 
statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level  in  columns  (1)  and  (2).  The  Democracy 
Dictatorship  variable  in  columns  (3)  and  (4)  is  not  statistically  significant  at 
conventional levels. The positive influence of the Chief in Executive variable is not 
robust, however, when we perform further robustness tests for this smaller sample 
excluding  Eastern  European  and  high  income  countries  (e.g.,  slightly  varying  the 
high/low  income  threshold).  Table  5  shows  that  democracy  does  not  have  an 
influence on the girls and boys enrolment ratios in tertiary education when Eastern  
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European and high income countries are excluded. By contrast, the results in Table 4 
show  that  gender  equality  in  education  was  significantly  lower  in  countries  with 
Muslim majorities and countries with Indigenous Religion: the Islam and Indigenous 
Religion dummy variables have negative signs and are statistically significant at the 
1% level. The religion variables have a somewhat weaker effect on gender equality in 
education at the tertiary level when Eastern European and high income countries are 
excluded  (Table  5)  but  inferences  regarding  the  influence  of  religion  on  gender 
equality in education do not change. 
The results presented in Tables 2 to 5 could be subject to omitted variable bias. 
We have therefore included female employment in agriculture (as a share of total 
employment)  because  employment  in  agriculture  has  been  traditionally  associated 
with greater gender and income inequality in favour of males. Female employment in 
agriculture has negatively influenced gender equality in education at the primary and 
secondary level. Female employment in agriculture has the expected negative sign 
and  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Including  female  employment  in 
agriculture significantly reduces the sample and even turns the democracy variable to 
a negative influence on gender equality in education. This robustness test confirms 
that the influence of democracy on gender equality in education strongly depends on 
the countries included in the sample. Inferences regarding religion do not change. 
In the base line model, we have employed cross sectional data on girls and 
boys enrolment ratios for the year 2006 and regressed it on averages of the democracy 
variables  over  the  1991 2005  period.  We  now  replace  the  cross sectional  data  on 
girls and boys enrolment ratios for the year 2006 by the data for the year 2001 and  
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regress it on averages of the democracy variables over the 1991 2000 period.
12 The 
results  are  very  similar  to  the  results  presented  in  Tables  2  to  5  and  inferences 
regarding the influence of democracy and religion on gender equality in education do 
not change. 
The girls and boys enrolment ratio at the tertiary level of education may well 
depend on the girls and boys enrolment ratio at the primary and secondary level of 
education.  We  have  therefore  included  the  girls and boys  enrolment  ratio  at  the 
primary and secondary level of education in 2001 as an explanatory variable in our 
model with the girls and boys enrolment ratio at the tertiary level of education in 
2006 as dependent variable. The girls and boys enrolment ratio at the primary and 
secondary level of education in 2001 has a positive sign and is statistically significant 
at the 10% level in the base line model and at the 5% level in the subsample when 
Eastern European and high income countries are excluded. Including the girls and 
boys enrolment ratio at the primary and secondary of education in 2001 does not 
change the inferences regarding the democracy and religion variables. 
We have focused on discrimination against  girls. Girls and boys  enrolment 
ratios that are significantly higher than 1 can also be interpreted as discrimination, 
against boys, however. We have therefore excluded all countries that have enrolment 
ratios in primary and secondary education higher than 1.05 and 1.1 and enrolment 
ratios in tertiary education higher than 1.05, 1.1, 1.5, 2.0 (the variance of enrolment 
ratios  in  tertiary  education  is  higher  than  in  primary  and  secondary  education). 
Enrolment ratios are especially high in some countries. The reason may well be that 
male dominant elites do not care about education because men will rule anyhow and 
                                                 
12 For some countries, data are not available for 2001 but for 2000 or 2002. We then use the data for 
2000 or 2002 to include as much countries as possible. 
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consider education as a waste of time. Excluding the countries with high enrolment 
ratios does not, however, make the democracy variables statistically significant. 
Democracies  can  be  coded  more  expansively.  Cheibub  et  al.  (2010)  have 
conservatively  coded countries as democracy only if there has been alternation in 
power.  Some  countries  appear,  however,  to  have  "contested"  elections  for  the 
executive and legislature, but there has never been an alternation of the government in 
power. The data by Cheibub et al. (2010) also allow consideration of these cases as 
democracies  in  addition  to  their  conservative  coding.  We  have  included  the  more 
expansive  democracy  coding.  Results  suggest  that  the  more  expansive  democracy 
variables  do  not  have  an  influence  on  gender  equality  in  education  (results  not 
shown). 
We have replaced the religion dummy variables using information from the 
Encyclopedia of World Geography (1994) and the CIA World Factbook (2010) by the 
data on religious fractionalization by Alesina et al. (2003). This database reports for 
each country in the year 1980 the percentage of the population belonging to the three 
most widespread religions in the world. We again distinguish Christianity, Buddhism, 
Islam, Hinduism and Indigenous Religion. Inferences are very similar to the results 
with the dummy variables on religion. In fact, the negative influence of Islam on 
gender equality in education is more severe with the data by Alesina et al. (2003). 
The  reported  effects  could  also  be  driven  or  mitigated  by  idiosyncratic 
circumstances in individual countries. For this reason, we checked whether the results 
are  sensitive  to  the  inclusion/exclusion  of  particular  countries.  The  results  (not 




5    Conclusion 
  Numerous studies have  focused on  government decisions in countries with 
limited democratic institutions. Such governments have incentives to resist economic 
development in various ways (Hillman, 2007; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008). We 
have investigated whether political institutions affect gender equality in education, 
with the counter explanation being culture and religion. The results suggest no robust 
effect of democratic political institutions on discrimination against girls in education. 
We find no evidence of gender discrimination in forestalling education in autocracies. 
Likewise, there is no gender discrimination in promoting education in democracies. 
We have found that culture and religion have a greater influence on gender equality in 
education than political institutions.  
Modernization may lead to both democratization and cultural change favoring 
gender  equality.  Inglehart  et  al.  (2002),  for  example,  investigate  the  relationship 
between gender equality and democratization by focusing on the role of women in 
parliament and politics. They conclude that “support for gender equality is not just a 
consequence  of  democratization.  It  is  part  of  a  broad  cultural  change  that  is 
transforming  industrialized  societies  and  bringing  growing  mass  demands  for 
increasingly democratic institutions” (p. 343). An important aspect of cultural change 
is how religion affects institutions and behaviour. Religion influences the level of 
democracy.  Muslim  countries  stand  out  in  being  more  authoritarian  and  less 
democratic  (Borooah  and  Paldam,  2007).  Muslim  countries  also  have  less  gender 
equality  (Norton  and  Tomal,  2009).  Our  empirical  results  suggest  that  the  gender 
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Figure  1:  Girls and Boys  Enrolment  Ratio  in  Primary  and  Secondary  Education 
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Figure 2: Girls and Boys Enrolment Ratio in Primary and Secondary Education 
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Figure 3: Girls and Boys Enrolment Ratio in Primary and Secondary Education 
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Figure 4: Girls and Boys Enrolment Ratio in Primary and Secondary Education 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  St. Dev  Min  Max  Source 
Girls/Boys in Primary and 
Secondary Education (Ratio) 
2006 
167  0.97  0.09  0.58  1.16  Worldbank (2010) 
Girls/Boys in Tertiary 
Education (Ratio) 
2006 
132  1.17  0.74  0.06  6.26  Worldbank (2010) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive 
154  4.60  2.04  1  7  Marshall and Jaggers 
(2006) 
Democracy Dictatorship  185  0.55  0.47  0  1  Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Africa  210  0.24  0.43  0  1  Own Calculation 
Asia  210  0.12  0.33  0  1  Own Calculation 
Middle East  210  0.10  0.29  0  1  Own Calculation 
Latin America  210  0.15  0.36  0  1  Own Calculation 
Eastern Europe  210  0.14  0.35  0  1  Own Calculation 
Western Europe  210  0.14  0.35  0  1  Own Calculation 
Northern America  210  0.01  0.12  0  1  Own Calculation 
Australia Oceania  210  0.08  0.27  0  1  Own Calculation 
Christian  210  0.61  0.49  0  1  Bateman and Egan 
(1994), CIA World 
Factbook (2010) 
Buddhism  210  0.07  0.25  0  1  Bateman and Egan 
(1994), CIA World 
Factbook (2010) 
Islam  210  0.25  0.43  0  1  Bateman and Egan 
(1994), CIA World 
Factbook (2010) 
Hinduism  210  0.02  0.15  0  1  Bateman and Egan 
(1994), CIA World 
Factbook (2010) 
Indigenous Religion  210  0.01  0.12  0  1  Bateman and Egan 
(1994), CIA World 
Factbook (2010) 
GDP per capita (constant 
prices) 
188  8615.46  9008.46  294.47  48970.31  Penn World Tables 6.3 
Heston and Summers 
(1991) 
Trade Openness 
(as a share of GDP) 
188  0.87  0.46  0.02  3.60  Penn World Tables 6.3 
Heston and Summers 
(1991) 
Government expenditures  188  0.21  0.11  0.04  0.67  Penn World Tables 6.3 
Heston and Summers 
(1991) 
Population  210  2.81E+07  1.13E+08  18206  1.24E+09  Worldbank (2010) 
Colony  189  0.41  0.49  0  1  Own Calculation 
Female Employment in 
Agriculture 
(as a share of total 
employment) 
155  0.24  0.23  0.00  0.89  Worldbank (2010) 
Christian (Alesina et al.)  210  0.46  0.37  0  1  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Buddhism (Alesina et al.)  210  0.04  0.18  0  0.96  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Islam (Alesina et al.)  210  0.23  0.36  0  1  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Hinduism (Alesina et al.)  210  0.02  0.10  0  0.93  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Indigenous Religion (Alesina 
et al.) 




Table 2: Regression results. Dependent variable: Girls and Boys Enrolment Ratio in 
Primary and Secondary Education. 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by region 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive  0.0102  0.0028     
  [1.43]  [0.43]     
Democracy Dictatorship       0.0024   0.0158 
      [0.14]  [0.99] 
Buddhism   0.0452   0.0509   0.0961   0.0842 
  [0.42]  [0.58]  [0.92]  [1.10] 
Islam   0.0615**   0.0558   0.0803**   0.0650* 
  [2.39]  [1.87]  [3.04]  [2.21] 
Hinduism   0.0248   0.0243  0.0118  0.0069 
  [0.92]  [0.79]  [0.20]  [0.44] 
Indigenous Religion   0.1930***   0.1852***   0.1926***   0.1725*** 
  [11.93]  [9.55]  [12.31]  [10.61] 
Asia  0.0563  0.051  0.075  0.0508 
  [1.03]  [0.93]  [1.76]  [1.43] 
Middle East  0.1230***  0.0626**  0.1209***  0.0634** 
  [7.14]  [2.80]  [6.33]  [2.89] 
Latin America  0.0800***  0.04  0.0854***  0.0402 
  [3.76]  [1.40]  [5.81]  [1.43] 
Eastern Europe  0.0814***  0.0451  0.0905***  0.0513* 
  [5.96]  [1.82]  [11.11]  [2.29] 
Western Europe  0.0561*   0.0327  0.0736***   0.0207 
  [1.93]  [0.77]  [4.42]  [0.51] 
North America  0.0516   0.0327  0.0725***   0.0211 
  [1.75]  [0.72]  [4.36]  [0.48] 
Australia Oceania  0.0542*  0.0087  0.0874***  0.0401 
  [1.95]  [0.27]  [6.86]  [1.83] 
log GDP per capita    0.0386***    0.0402*** 
    [3.80]    [3.50] 
Trade Openness    0.0043    0.0008 
    [0.28]    [0.05] 
Government expenditures     0.1524***     0.1058 
    [4.03]    [1.81] 
log population     0.0075     0.0063 
    [1.37]    [1.17] 
Colony     0.0035     0.0031 
    [0.24]    [0.17] 
Constant  0.8721***  0.7665***  0.9249***  0.7479*** 
  [38.15]  [5.40]  [137.79]  [4.56] 
Obs.  135  132  157  151 
R Squared  0.37  0.51  0.34  0.51 








Table 3: Regression results. Dependent variable: Girls and Boys Enrolment Ratio in 
Tertiary Education. 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by region 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive   0.0272   0.0757     
  [0.39]  [1.09]     
Democracy Dictatorship       0.168   0.2407 
      [0.97]  [1.71] 
Buddhism   0.3768   0.5732**   0.7161**   0.6360*** 
  [0.76]  [2.91]  [2.40]  [3.87] 
Islam   0.2437*   0.3071**   0.2894***   0.2795** 
  [2.33]  [3.46]  [4.49]  [3.21] 
Hinduism  0.3781  0.2829  0.2714  0.2776 
  [1.09]  [0.68]  [0.71]  [0.65] 
Indigenous Religion   0.3763***   0.3686**   0.3583***   0.2874* 
  [12.47]  [3.00]  [4.87]  [2.17] 
Asia  0.4985  0.6264**  0.7011***  0.4951** 
  [1.70]  [2.58]  [4.88]  [2.78] 
Middle East  1.1443***  0.7307**  1.1410***  0.7170** 
  [14.54]  [2.55]  [20.33]  [2.64] 
Latin America  0.6465***  0.4058  0.6509***  0.4505*** 
  [4.78]  [1.75]  [6.10]  [4.07] 
Eastern Europe  0.7134***  0.4943  0.7083***  0.5595** 
  [6.46]  [1.57]  [10.27]  [3.13] 
Western Europe  0.6846**  0.0702  0.6733***  0.0594 
  [3.05]  [0.27]  [4.93]  [0.35] 
North America  0.8370***  0.4355  0.8347***  0.3128 
  [3.66]  [1.57]  [6.11]  [1.16] 
Australia Oceania  0.7446***  0.1276  0.7234***  0.1046 
  [3.62]  [0.67]  [6.68]  [0.60] 
log GDP per capita    0.3384    0.3495 
    [1.67]    [1.86] 
Trade Openness     0.1171     0.2214 
    [0.42]    [0.99] 
Government expenditures     0.1862     0.0573 
    [0.64]    [0.19] 
log population     0.1241     0.1029* 
    [1.72]    [2.08] 
Colony    0.1498    0.2371 
    [0.41]    [0.76] 
Constant  0.7631**  0.4529  0.7433***   0.2275 
  [2.85]  [0.65]  [15.86]  [0.19] 
Obs.  115  112  123  119 
R Squared  0.29  0.52  0.29  0.54 








Table 4: Regression results. Dependent variable: Girls and Boys Enrolment Ratio in 
Primary and Secondary Education.  
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by region 
Eastern European and high income countries excluded. 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive  0.0284**  0.0245**     
  [2.83]  [4.29]     
Democracy Dictatorship      0.0352  0.0357 
      [0.92]  [1.16] 
Buddhism   0.0466   0.0565   0.104   0.0795 
  [0.40]  [0.53]  [0.85]  [0.70] 
Islam   0.0704**   0.0848***   0.0907***   0.0940*** 
  [3.71]  [4.99]  [10.71]  [6.45] 
Hinduism   0.0751   0.0628   0.0696   0.0465 
  [1.57]  [2.02]  [1.82]  [1.57] 
Indigenous Religion   0.2148***   0.2357***   0.2020***   0.2200*** 
  [15.93]  [28.91]  [7.52]  [16.80] 
Asia  0.0537  0.0106  0.0828  0.0266 
  [0.99]  [0.15]  [1.70]  [0.38] 
Middle East  0.0837***  0.0802**  0.0739***  0.0774** 
  [5.57]  [3.34]  [5.26]  [3.03] 
Latin America  0.0637**   0.0722  0.1045***   0.0031 
  [3.65]  [2.10]  [4.92]  [0.08] 
Australia Oceania   0.0617   0.0816**  0.0757*  0.0524** 
  [1.89]  [3.45]  [2.59]  [3.21] 
log GDP per capita    0.0884*    0.0851 
    [2.23]    [1.86] 
Trade Openness    0.0262    0.0421 
    [0.58]    [1.27] 
Government expenditures     0.2101***     0.2096*** 
    [4.79]    [4.61] 
log population     0.0142     0.0079 
    [1.96]    [1.27] 
Colony     0.0493**     0.0166 
    [3.78]    [1.33] 
Constant  0.8026***  0.5013  0.8990***  0.4591 
  [20.70]  [1.67]  [90.20]  [1.35] 
Obs.  52  51  55  53 
R Squared  0.32  0.53  0.29  0.50 










Table 5: Regression results. Dependent variable: Girls and Boys Enrolment Ratio in 
Tertiary Education. 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by region. 
Eastern European and high income countries excluded. 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive  0.0624  0.0259     
  [1.41]  [0.81]     
Democracy Dictatorship       0.2453   0.1496 
      [0.81]  [0.84] 
Buddhism   0.0993   0.2956   0.5366*   0.4676** 
  [0.41]  [1.79]  [2.48]  [3.86] 
Islam   0.136   0.1637   0.2083**   0.1980** 
  [1.42]  [1.83]  [4.21]  [4.00] 
Hinduism  0.2513  0.2223  0.2301  0.1613 
  [0.30]  [0.81]  [0.38]  [0.63] 
Indigenous Religion   0.3302***   0.2752**   0.2338   0.1892 
  [6.82]  [3.89]  [2.05]  [1.35] 
Asia  0.2821  0.3036  0.5004*  0.3822** 
  [2.35]  [2.05]  [2.88]  [3.70] 
Middle East  0.4662**  0.4839***  0.4658***  0.4762** 
  [4.46]  [6.23]  [10.29]  [4.06] 
Latin America  0.6534  0.0867  0.8505*  0.4271* 
  [2.10]  [0.40]  [2.95]  [2.81] 
Australia Oceania  ...  ...  ...  ... 
  ...  ...  ...  ... 
log GDP per capita    0.0435    0.051 
    [0.56]    [0.63] 
Trade Openness    0.6397*    0.6106** 
    [2.91]    [4.07] 
Government expenditures     0.666     0.6105 
    [1.59]    [1.78] 
log population     0.0125    0.0158 
    [0.66]    [0.40] 
Colony     0.2437     0.0703 
    [1.51]    [1.85] 
Constant  0.3647*  0.3989  0.6671***   0.136 
  [2.59]  [0.82]  [8.54]  [0.13] 
Obs.  39  38  39  38 
R Squared  0.51  0.79  0.58  0.8 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
 
 
 
 
 